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
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POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS

of Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy in Yugoslavia

Complying with the wishes of its Yugoslav and foreign readers to become acquainted with the results accomplished so far and future prospects of the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Yugoslavia, the editors of the Review of „International Affairs“ submitted several questions on this subject to Aleksandar Ranković the Chairman of the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission.

Chairman Ranković complied with the request of the „Review of International Affairs“ and gave the following answers to the questions asked:

QUESTION: What results have been accomplished so far in the application of nuclear energy in our country and what are the prospects of its further development?

ANSWER: Isotopes are one of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which affords manifold and valuable benefits. Isotopes are already playing an important role in science, technology and medicine. As we know new uses and methods of application are being discovered all the time, whose importance, according to some expectations, will be equal to nuclear energy as a new source of power. With its effect in some domains of economy isotopes have already justified their large scale application and utilization. In the field of medicine it has already become an important and in some case indeed an indispensable factor.

In view of the foregoing the introduction and large scale application of nuclear energy in our country opens broad prospects for the promotion of our economy and other activities. Apart from this the basis will also be created not only for the discovery of new uses for the promotion of the technical level and the enrichment of our scientific achievements, but also the implementation of the programme and the future of nuclear energy in our country.

In point of fact the activities on the peaceful application of nuclear energy were intensified last year. The level of our scien-

tific and technical achievements require a broader approach to the practical exploitation of nuclear energy. Steps have been taken in this respect to enlist the interest of the broadest possible circles and organisations for this technical application. Concrete measures were drafted at numerous expert meetings and conferences for the solution of this problem. The keen interest of our scientists and experts for the practical application of radioisotopes was revealed on this occasion. In the economic and social organisations and some industrial enterprises groups have been formed which have systematically approached the gradual implementation of these changes. Experiments with the practical application of radio-isotopes were conducted in several clinics and medical institutions which yielded favourable results and on which several scientific papers were published.

After such systematic preparations in the course of this year the organization of a series of experimental centres for the individual fields of application such as medicine, agriculture and industry for example will be initiated in accordance with the work programme adopted. The centres will be equipped with the modern apparatus necessary for the successful application of these new scientific discoveries. Our industrial laboratories and institutes should be enabled to procure the necessary up-to-date equipment and concentrate to an ever greater extent on the solution of indu-

strial and technical problems thus assuming the role of mediator between our achievements in the field of nuclear science on the one hand, and the need for the modernization of our industry and health service on the other. A bolder approach is noticeable this year at courses, schools and faculties as regards the education of future cadres for these activities, while in industry the production of standard apparatus and equipment required for the application of isotopes in the above mentioned domains has gained a new impulse. Hence the trained personnel and the indispensable modern equipment constitute two decisive factors in this respect.

Our first reactor in Vinca which will come into operation by the end of 1958 will provide a broad material basis for the manifold application of radio-isotopes as it will enable our scientists to develop scientific research and make available substantial quantities of radio-isotopes to our economy and health service. Industry will use the reactor for the testing of specific materials which are being used today in nuclear techniques and engineering. Consequently, as the material conditions will largely be ensured it will therefore be necessary to enlist our industry and other branches concerned to begin the most rational use of these resources and possibilities.

QUESTION: *Have any long term development programmes of nuclear energy been made in our country?*

ANSWER: This question was also advanced last year as a task of prime importance. Needless to say, this is an extremely complex and responsible task because the perspectives concerning the future development of nuclear energy in our country require extensive preparations thus enabling the future course of development of the individual branches of science technology, engineering, industrial production etc., to be charted. Needless to say future development will be conditioned by new discoveries which may be unexpected and revolutionary especially where nuclear energy is concerned.

Our long term plan must therefore contain all elements and factors which will enable the coordination of these activities in our country with the development of nuclear science and technology in the world, needless to say, according to our own material possibilities and scientific and economic forces. The outlines of these long term plans have already been more clearly defined at present and we hope that they will soon be put forward for discussion.

In view of the fact that our nuclear institutes are acquiring an increasingly specific character with regard to scientific research work, the long term plan should provide for the further promotion of the basic and practical research which will yield immediate benefit to the economy.

As for the procurement of nuclear and other materials the long term plan foresees the most rational utilization of our potential possibilities in the country thus providing the basis for a broader application of nuclear energy in the power industry in the less immediate future. Although our country disposes with abundant other sources of energy such as coal and water power, the problem of nuclear power is not being neglected either and will doubtless play an important role as a source of power in the future.

The industrious work of our institutes and scientific personnel have brought about the necessary basic conditions, scientific research work, trained staff and nuclear raw materials, thus affording a solid basis for the future promotion of nuclear energy and its application for peacetime purposes.

QUESTION: *What are the contacts of our nuclear scientists with their foreign colleagues? We would particularly like to know your views on the establishment of the International Atomic Agency?*

ANSWER: I would primarily like to stress that our country is consistently endeavouring that nuclear energy be used exclusively for peaceful pursuits and to the benefit of mankind, or in other words that we are opposed to the use of nuclear energy for any military purpose whatever.

As for the first part of your question, let me say that our nuclear research centres are not of a closed type or in other words that they were open to all forms of cooperation from the very beginning which was not the case with the other centres in the world. At the same time it should be stressed that our scientists cooperated closely and without reserve with the scientists of many other countries, and that the initiative was often given by the Yugoslav scientists.

Today cooperation has been established with a series of eastern and western countries. In the same way our Commission also maintains contacts with the majority of atom commissions throughout the world.

As known the broad and free exchange of scientific achievements is a basic precondition for the development of science in general. The consistent implementation of this policy in the field of nuclear energy as well as cooperation with all who adhere to the same principles enabled our scientists and scientific institutions to establish and promote numerous and varied contacts with scientists and research centres the world over. The results of such activities included frequent mutual visits and a broad exchange of scientific works and publications. Unfortunately in the post war period such exchanges were hampered in the scientific domains on which the development of nuclear energy is contingent. The Geneva Atom Conference marked an important turning point in this respect, although such a degree of exchange and cooperation as desired by the scientists and peoples of the world was not achieved on that occasion either. Many achievements have still remained unpublished today. There are still certain obstacles which impede universal scientific cooperation in this domain.

As for the existing international organizations for cooperation in the field of nuclear science we consider that such bodies should be based on the principle of equal rights, thus ensuring the broad participation of all nations concerned, while excluding bloc tendencies which would be particularly detrimental in this sphere. We consider that such organizations in which the political influence of the big powers is dominant represent a stumbling bloc to the constructive promotion of nuclear energy and imply the deterioration of political relations.

On the other hand we have given our full support to the establishment of the International Atomic Agency from the very beginning. We hope that it will be an instrument for the further development of international cooperation and become an organization which will really fulfill the aspirations of the developed and underdeveloped countries alike.

In closing I would like to add that we will continue our endeavours to bring genuine cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The further exchange of scientific views will be a factor of further scientific progress and enable the complete and prompt mastery of the new mighty resources which will exert an enormous influence on the progress and prosperity of mankind.

TITO:

"If we contemplate the discovery of nuclear energy exclusively as a means providing unlimited possibilities for the benefit of mankind, not its destruction, then we have a clear pointer as to the direction in which international relations should develop. This shows that relations should develop towards the achievement of integration, towards the achievement of international cooperation on all problems which lead to the prosperity of mankind. We are convinced that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful industrial purposes, for improvement of the standard of living and elimination of poverty and backwardness which are one of the principal reasons underlying armed conflicts constitutes the only correct road which ensures the progress of mankind".

(From the exposé of President Tito in the Federal Peoples Assembly on March 7, 1955)

NEW US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

L. ERVEN

II

A PART from formulating the measures which constitute the concrete plan of US political activities in the Middle East, the Eisenhower doctrine also provides an exposé of the situation and motives. This exposé could be summed up as follows:

The Middle East is confronted by the danger of Soviet domination. This danger is twofold and primarily consists of the threat of direct Soviet aggression, or aggression by "any country under the domination of international communism"; the other threat lies in indirect aggression carried out by means of subversion and infiltration of international communism. In one form or another eventual Soviet domination would place the freedom, sovereignty and independence of the Middle Eastern countries in jeopardy and endanger the vital interests of the Western countries, the security of the USA and the spiritual values of the three religions which sprang up in that area. As stated in the text of the doctrine, Soviet domination would represent a tragedy for this area and for many other countries whose economic life would be virtually suppressed. Western Europe would be placed in the same dangerous position as if the Marshall Plan or the NATO had never existed. "It would be intolerable if the holy shrines in the Middle East were subjected to a power which glorifies atheist materialism".

The countries of the Middle East would not be able to defend themselves alone against direct aggression, while the UN organization, under the present conditions would be unable to offer the security of this area. Therefore the USA will provide the necessary military protection if asked to do so. However the Middle Eastern countries are capable of struggling against indirect aggression by themselves, provided they preserve their sovereignty and independence, their economic stability and military strength, and provided they are not intimidated by eventual pressure and threats of direct aggression. Therefore the USA is prepared to extend appropriate economic and military assistance to all these countries or groups of countries.

How does this thesis appear, however, in the light of the actual situation to which these measures should be applied, and in the light of the motives and arguments by which it is justified.

ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION

In expounding the situation in the Middle East the US doctrine states in the first place, that since World War II the process of independence and sovereignty of these countries developed mostly in a peaceful manner. There were cases of unrest, mistrust and fear which gave rise to a high degree of instability in a large part of the Middle East area. Open hostilities broke out of late in which the West European countries which formerly wielded a strong influence in this region were also involved. The Israeli attack on Egypt likewise aggravated the fundamental contradictions between that nation and its neighbours. The general instability was further enhanced and fostered from time to time by international communism.

However the Soviet tendency to establish its domination in the Middle East represents the principal danger for the independence of these countries. The doctrine draws such a conclusion from the general assessment of the tendencies of Soviet policy which were manifested in the "long term Russian dreams to establish domination both during the tsars and under the bolsheviks". Such aspirations however were not justified by considerations of security, or the economic interests of the Soviet Union, as their reason lies "exclusively in power politics" whose aim is to "bolshevize the world".

Such an assessment of the Middle Eastern situation is both false and entirely arbitrary. The US doctrine exaggerates the role of "international communism" while underrating the role of western colonialism. The doctrine does not give its views on the different aspects of colonial policy and western intervention in the Middle East, except indirectly through its support of sovereignty and independence. There is a cursory allusion to the presence of the Western powers in the Middle East and aggression against Egypt. Persistent stress is laid however on the "dangers of international communism" which constitute the "Leitmotif" of the new US policy.

However the policy of western domination is a factor which exerted its active influence in all phases of Middle Eastern development before and after World War II during the past seventeen years while Soviet domination and international communism is only an American incubus and hypothesis in the future development of this situation. The high degree of instability is a result of western interference and machinations in the Middle East, and not a consequence of international communism. The history of the Middle East, so far is the history of the struggle of the peoples of that area against Western, not Soviet domination.

The American assessment of the situation in the Middle East was perhaps opportune at the moment for the justification of the new policy in the maze of US-Soviet misunderstandings, but it is objectively wrong and historically incorrect. It cannot cloud the picture of Middle Eastern realities. The one sided position of the US doctrine which ensues from such an assessment was also manifested in the measures planned which are primarily based on the hypotheses of future Soviet activities. It may be inferred therefrom that US diplomacy does not consider the previous forms of western domination in the Middle Eastern area as a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Middle Eastern countries. For a policy which invokes the support of full international objectivity, and which professes that vast military and economic resources are being pledged for the defence of the full sovereignty and independence of the Middle East which this policy endorses without the slightest reserve, such an attitude is doubtless a short-coming, irrespectively of the fact whether its general thesis is correct or not. The invocation of the principle of sovereignty and independence of the Middle Eastern countries is insufficient, because so far none of the Western powers which conflicted with these countries confessed that its policy and activities, its agreements and bases were contrary to these principles.

It may be inferred from the other actions of the US Government if not from this doctrine that its policy does not condone the use of force in international relations, even if aggression would come from the West and not only from the East. However in view of such an attitude which was clearly manifested during the recent events touched off by direct western aggression, something should also have been said of the US views concerning indirect aggression, not only when coming from the Soviet Union and international communism, but also when stemming from the West and western colonialism.

Owing to these weaknesses the study of the doctrine gives the impression that the interests of the Near Eastern countries are mingled and identified with the interests of the Western powers, and that only the things which are dangerous for the policy of the Western powers, western security or what is generally referred to in the West as the "Western world" is considered as a threat to the Mideast. This is obviously contrary to the history and development trends of this area.

In the text of this doctrine and still more in the subsequent explanations, primarily of US Foreign Secretary Dulles, the Soviet threat in the Middle East has been represented as acute, and the measures proposed as extremely urgent. It is not possible to see

either from the text of the doctrine or the clarifications that followed why this danger which consists according to the doctrine, in the age old dream of the tsarist and Soviet policy to establish domination in the Middle East should suddenly have become so acute. The actual reasons we can only conjecture. A useful pointer in these speculations is provided by the western press, which characterized the situation in the Mideast after the breakdown of the Anglo-French policy as a "vacuum" which should be filled, as already stated by a new exponent of western policy and interests. This would lead to the conclusion that the new US doctrine was not called forth by any new Soviet danger to which the doctrine alludes but the appearance of this "vacuum" which is not mentioned in the doctrine. According to a false conviction which is nourished in these circles, contrary to the fundamental characteristics of the resistance of the Middle Eastern countries, this area cannot exist without the "protection", "care" or "advice" of some external power.

MIDDLE EASTERN INTERESTS THREATENED

The doctrine lays down three factors which determine the significance of the Middle East: petroleum, the Suez Canal and the holy shrines of Mecca and Jerusalem.

Petroleum and the Suez Canal it is said are of decisive importance, especially for the countries of Western Europe and their loss would be fatal for the European countries; the latter might happen if the countries of the Middle East lose their independence and if they are ruled by foreign powers: "hostile to freedom". One of the objectives of the measures proposed is to forestall this economic catastrophe for Western Europe.

Such arguments inevitably give rise to two major objections. One is that the independence of the Middle Eastern countries is treated as a function of the regular supply of the Western countries with Middle Eastern oil, and not the value and interests of the respective countries themselves. The second is directly connected with the problem of oil. In its assessment of the importance of oil the US thesis is primarily conscious of the interests of the countries which exploit the Mideastern oil resources, while ignoring the interest of the countries on whose territories the oil is located and which should be the first to benefit by the prosperity afforded by these sources.

The American plan advocates the defence of the oil bearing areas from Soviet domination, and does not contain even theoretical reflections on the defence of these areas from western exploitation, which is real, nor on any more up to date system of their exploitation which would correspond better to the interests of the Middle Eastern peoples and the principles of their sovereignty and independence. A more objective and less superficial analysis of the Middle Eastern problems would be capable of probing more deeply and broadly into the question of oil exploitation all the more so as it is obvious that the present system of concessionary oil companies and the conflicts they called forth were one of the causes underlying the "high degree of instability" in that area and represent the economic basis of foreign influence which frequently conflicted with the interests of Middle Eastern independence. In this way when the Middle Eastern problem is contemplated exclusively from the standpoint that a change of political conditions might impede or almost entirely compromise the supply of the Western countries, one inevitably reaches the conclusion that the defence of the Middle East from Soviet domination is dictated by considerations of defending the western interests committed in the existing system of petroleum concessions and not considerations of Middle Eastern independence.

Apart from petroleum, "the holy shrines" of Mecca and Jerusalem are also included among the motives of the new US policy in the Middle East. The Middle East is important for the preservation of spiritual values and culture, as three religions have sprang up on its soil, and the shrines of these religions which symbolize the riteachings are located there. The Eisenhower doctrine

considers, alreiydas a stated that it would be intolerable if these holy shrines were to be subjected by a power which "glorifies atheist materialism".

Needless to say such arguments cannot be discussed nor is it worth while to discuss them. It may nevertheless be said that as a motive for a political plan of an extremely extensive scope and objectives such arguments are somewhat unusual and anachronistic to say the least. Religious considerations and speculations are frequently included in the political motivations of the American actions and the speeches of US politicians. This is their own business of course. It could only be said that it is a little odd that such religious fervour and dedication to spiritual values should be placed side by side with an entirely prosaic interest for such a crude and materialistic thing as petroleum.

The Eisenhower doctrine expresses the full support of the US Government to the principles of sovereignty and independence of the Middle Eastern countries but does not devote sufficient attention to the internal conditions in this area on which the guaranty of sovereignty and independence is contingent. This is the fundamental weakness of this doctrine, which is conceived exclusively as a reflection of US-Soviet contradictions in this area. The failure to grasp the essence of the problem may constitute a prime reason for the failure of this plan, which is being prognosticated on many sides already.

* * *

In the various reactions called forth by the publication of this doctrine the greatest attention was devoted to the powers for direct armed intervention in case of aggression. It was considered that these powers represent the most important element of the doctrine. The greater part of explications given to the Committees on this doctrine consisted in the interpretation of these powers (let it be said in passing that these clarifications succeeded in clouding and complicating the issue still further).

However it is the other powers referring to the system of military and economic aid which actually represent the essence and practical significance of this doctrine. This is the policy which can be developed immediately and which will enable the USA according to the expectations based on this plan to exert its influence on the development of political events in the Middle East. Armed intervention is a far more complicated action conditioned by the advent of aggression or at least some other events which could be identified with aggression. The authorization to use armed force in fact represents a reserve clause whose sense, as stated in the doctrine, is to serve as a "warning" of the reaction which would be touched off by eventual aggression. It is improbable that the authors of this doctrine consider such an aggression likely. Its hypothesis was included in the doctrine not because it is really foreseen, as much as to stress the gravity of a situation for which the government seeks a blank cheque for a long term action.

What the USA wishes to prevent by the policy formulated by this doctrine is not so much open Soviet aggression, which remains a secondary hypothesis unlikely for the time being, as much as the growth of Soviet influence in that area, the expansion of its international relations for which a favourable atmosphere has been created, the promotion of economic cooperation and the extension of economic and other aid to the countries of the Middle East, by means of which new social orientations can be brought about in these countries, or in other words all that this doctrine actually refers to by the simplified and cryptic expression of "indirect aggression" and "international communism".

In view of the concrete conditions which prevail in the Middle Eastern area the system of measures proposed, especially the system of military and economic aid would represent a separate problem which transcends the framework of this article on the salient features of the new US doctrine on Middle Eastern policy. One could speak more concretely of the former only when the reactions called forth by the Eisenhower doctrine among the governments of the countries to whom this assistance is offered in principle are known. The unequal response which is most likely, would greatly complicate the task set by this doctrine before US policy.

THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT BEFORE THE UNO

Gavro ALTMAN

TALK about disarmament has been going on for years. Meanwhile the armed forces of many countries reached numerically the highest peace-time level in history, the arsenals are filled with arms of extraordinary destructive power, and the art of destructiveness attained a high degree of perfection. Some twenty or thirty years ago, endless talks on disarmament were carried on in the League of Nations but these talks failed to prevent the approach and outbreak of the Second World War. All these are bitter but true facts.

But could one say that the long unfavourable experience has produced a decline of interest among ordinary people — the factor of international policy usually called the world opinion — for a reduction of the giant armies and stockpiles of arms and ammunition? Certainly not. The psychosis of uncertainty born of accelerated arming, the economic burden of maintaining a modern army, the fact that one could not imagine today the removal of the crying disproportion between the developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor countries unless it be at the expense of armaments funds — all these are elements of reality which can neither be forgotten nor evaded as they find their way, in one way or another, into every home and everybody's life. The fact that disarmament is a general problem explains why it has remained on the agenda for so long even at the time when cold war assumed an aspect of a real armed conflict.

Something has changed, nevertheless. There is no doubt that big, high-sounding and attractive projects which promised the world the only „possible“ and the only „sure“ means of getting to the realm of security and tranquillity — in case all should adopt them — are not arousing such great interest now. The ordinary but attentive observer, who spared no efforts to find his way through the maze of plans and counter-plans on disarmament has long since realized that the more imposing they are, the less their authors seem ready to conclude practical agreements. Nor is he attracted by the hackneyed formula on the „rapprochement of views“, as it happened a number of times, during negotiations on disarmament, that one side accepted the attitude of the other — the very attitude which it had attacked previously — while the latter renounced its own concepts. To lay stress on this phenomenon, does not mean, of course, to underestimate the rapprochement of views, which has a definite value — but only in case the powers on whom agreement depends are really bent on reaching it or at least seeking it. In fear of the danger of general and total annihilation, especially since it became quite clear that nuclear weapons are not quite safe even in peace-time use — a large section of the world public realized that the fate of disarmament as well as that of other international problems does not depend on whether one or another project shall be adopted or not: what is involved here is the imperative of ensuring a minimum international confidence which, again, cannot be accomplished without negotiations and their fruits. International confidence is not a thing to be given and received as a gift — it is a process which feeds on agreements and their results, which resists limited, partial solutions, more or less satisfactory compromises, paving the way for larger solutions. Bearing all this in mind, we do not hesitate to say that every soldier, who would be demobilized in keeping with the international agreement, that every rifle scrapped on the basis of such an arrangement — would mean more than a conspicuously imposing, ambitious and far-reaching but — unaccepted plan on disarmament.

* * *

The Yugoslav delegation was guided by this truth when it proposed, at the session of the UN Disarmament Commission in July last year, that efforts be resumed for reaching an agreement on general disarmament but urging at the same time that all the elements of disarmament on which initial agreements could be

reached immediately, be ascertained and fixed, no matter whether, these agreements be minimal. On this occasion the Yugoslav delegation mentioned several concrete possibilities: reduction of conventional armaments, blocking of military expenditures, calling off or at least limiting nuclear weapon experiments. Attention aroused by the suggestion for an orientation towards initial agreements especially among the representatives of smaller countries, is to be explained above all by the fact that it was an expression of the general experience and general wish to pass from big plans onto palpable practical measures. But at that time, the great powers, members of the Sub-Committee for Disarmament, were still rigidly adhering to equally rigid and exclusive projects. As a result last year's meeting of the Sub-Committee simply „forgot“ the useful Indian proposal on discontinuance or limitation of nuclear explosions, although this proposal was included in the resolution of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of UNO and was sent to the Sub-Committee for Disarmament as a component part of the resolution. The Disarmament file was augmented at the Session of the Commission by new proposals, including the Yugoslav, but only very small progress was recorded.

A great many things have happened since then, chiefly negative. As a result of the Suez crisis and events in Hungary, the international political atmosphere was again gripped by a cold wave, the process of the relaxation of tension came up against big obstacles and has been slowed down at least for a time. In mid-autumn last year even the mention of disarmament might have sounded absurd.

* * *

Despite this state of affairs, the debate in the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly was not discouraging. It even aroused certain hopes to the effect that future talks, conducted on a partly new basis, might get things under way.

As a sort of preamble to that debate, came the Soviet Government statement of November 17. In addition to the already known proposals for the fixing of the maximum level of the armed forces, the reduction of armed forces of the great powers on German territory, etc., the statement also contained an interesting novelty: the Soviet Government accepted in principle the Eisenhower Plan on air inspection and photography over an area extending to 800 kilometres east and west of the line which divides members of the Atlantic and the Warsaw Pacts. This again meant the „piercing“ of the boundary between projects which had been irreconcilable to the point of excluding each other.

This fact became even more evident when the American representative Cabot Lodge submitted, in the Political Committee, the new American plan on Disarmament. Whereas the USA, not so long ago, insisted exclusively on air inspection — possibly combined with the setting up of inspection groups at strategically important points — the American plans recently saw the insertion of clauses which speak about the need for preventing further accumulation of nuclear weapons, call for a control of experiments with guided missiles, etc. Without entering into the value or practicality of these ideas, it suffices to point out that the American attitude has become somewhat more elastic.

Despite mutual Soviet-American accusations in connection with the Near East developments, the „Eisenhower Doctrine“ and events in Hungary, the atmosphere in the Political Committee was marked by a spirit of tolerance, while the unanimity with which the Resolution on Disarmament was voted, though that resolution was only procedural, is without doubt an important result. If the prospects of disarmament are viewed without illusions, then it may be said that the debate in the General Assembly is a step forward above all because the idea on the need for initial and practical agreements has been acknowledged.

* * *

How are we to explain this relative progress after the recent untoward events? A decisive role was certainly played by the pressure of world opinion — usually expressed through the attitudes of smaller, „non-bloc“ countries — which feared the spread of local conflicts and adventures to the rest of the world embracing it in a general conflagration. Nor are we to underestimate the fact that in a world divided into opposing blocs, where many international problems have assumed extremely complicated forms, disarmament is one of those spheres where practical arrangements could be achieved — without a dislocation of the present relation of forces. Finally, this General Assembly Session testifies

to the fact that under-developed countries are ever more loudly voicing their demands and expressing the conviction that even any minimal reduction of military expenditures would create possibilities for allotting larger funds to economically retarded parts of the world.

Disarmament in any case tops the list of international problems not only because of its first rate significance and urgency but also because realistic possibilities exist for agreement in this field — provided progress is made step by step with a lot of good will and with modest pretensions. The forthcoming session of the Sub-Committee for Disarmament will show how much the great powers have learned from past experience and dispositions which were so convincingly expressed in the General Assembly.

The »Economization« of Military Political Alliances, or UN Collective Security

Janez STANOVNIK

„THE Eisenhower Doctrine“ was a disappointment to many who followed the discussion on the new look of international economic assistance with optimism. The optimists expected that after the establishment of the International Atom Agency Eisenhower will bequeath his name to history by giving the initiative for the creation, within the UN, of an Agency for economic development.

The entire discussion on the new ways of extending international aid proceeded in an atmosphere of large scale relaxation of international tension. The confession that „Stalin... used methods of mass repression and abuse of power“ (Khrushchev on February 24, 1956) gave rise to many optimistic expectations which were quelled by the end of the year by the statement that „Stalin“ was a great Marxist“ and that „we are all Stalinists“ (Khrushchev December 31, 1956). In the meantime however, an extensive discussion was waged both in the East and West on international relations in a world in which problems will be deprived of ideological, military and even political elements, an economic aid serve to an ever greater extent as an instrument for the achievement of genuine equality among nations.

Although the events in Hungary and Egypt, as well as the „Eisenhower Doctrine“ and neo-Stalinism have temporarily interrupted this positive course of development, this discussion was not deprived of its significance having reaffirmed that temporary recurrence of tension is only a transient phenomenon at present and that the demand for a new international economic integration appears as a new constant.

At one time the French Prime Minister Faure provoked a lively discussion at the Geneva summit conference by his proposal on the „economization of disarmament“. According to this concept which was subsequently worked out in greater detail, the contributions of the individual big powers to a UN fund for the economic development of the underdeveloped countries should serve as a practical control (and proof) of the actual reduction of armaments and military expenditure carried out. The idea on the „economization“ of military pacts however only represents an attempt in this discussion to preserve military political blocs also under the newly created circumstances. Mr. Pearson's proposals to set up international control and records of bilateral activities in the domain of economic aid represents an attempt to devise a compromise solution and an evolution from bloc concepts to genuine world economic integration within the UN.

The views of those who realized that the preservation of cold war elements cannot provide a basis for the building up of new international relations were also manifested during the discussion. It would seem that this realization was made not only by Charles Ball and Walter Reuther, but also by Barbara Ward and many labourites. They all asked that the industrial countries assume the obligation to earmark a regular fixed percentage of their national income for the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. However, even these proposals which actually went the farthest, did not quite transcend the ideological frame-

work of the demands for the defence and integration of the „free world“.

The concept of „rival coexistence“ actually imposed ideological limits even to the most farsighted. According to this concept the two blocs namely the two systems should vie with each other in enlisting the sympathies of the „neutral zone“ or „peace zone“ as the underdeveloped countries are referred to respectively on both sides. Coexistence however does not and cannot lie in the strengthening of bloc formations under new conditions and by new means. Every attempt to extend the „spheres of influence“ either by military, political or economic methods must inevitably lead to the breakdown of „peaceful coexistence“ and a retrogression to cold war methods. The failure of both sides to understand sufficiently that the full recognition of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and not the rivalry between two systems, is the genuine and only basis for coexistence, is probably to blame for the fact that the improvement of the international climate was overshadowed by a renewal of tension by the end of the year.

The discussion on international economic aid which took place in the course of 1956 did not remain without results however. In the first place it provided a critical analysis of the experiences acquired in this sphere so far. This analysis has shown that the weakest point of all previous efforts both bilateral and multilateral consisted in insufficient national integration. The projects financed by foreign funds were often planned so that they presupposed comparatively far higher investments from domestic resources, thus integrating this project into the national production mechanism. However owing to the general shortage of national financing resources, such projects remained severed from the national economy for which they represented rather a strain than benefit in the long run. It clearly ensues from this experience that there is something wrong in the philosophy of „teaching others what to do“. The experiences acquired in the past have formulated a new philosophy for the future: „Help others to fend for themselves to the best of their ability“.

The analysis has likewise shown that cyclic fluctuations and financial instability constituted the weak point of the previous actions undertaken in the sphere of international aid. Chronic instability prevented the integration of foreign aid into the national economic development programme. The economic effects of this aid were therefore far smaller than they might have been.

The past experiences, finally, unequivocally speak in favour of multilateral aid as distinct from that bilateral.

The actual economic results of multilaterality were, in spite of all shortcomings which still beset them, far greater than the results yielded by bilateral programmes.

The realization of the need of a more resolute and broader assistance to underdeveloped countries has still not sufficiently penetrated into the minds of people in the industrial countries. While Holland received 47 dollars of aid per capita under the Marshall Plan in the 1948/49 fiscal year alone, Britain 24 dollars

and Italy 11 dollars, India received only one dollar per capita during entire First Five Year Plan.

The analysis of the past also indicates the road to be followed in the future. The interests of world economy and the national economies of the industrial countries require a more resolute and broader assistance to the underdeveloped countries. This aid should become an integral part of their national efforts

aiming at economic development. There should be no political strings attached to aid. The interests of the international community should be sought in the independence of the individual national economies. Therefore an increase of UN activities in the sphere of international economic cooperation would not only contribute to the promotion of world economic stability but also represents an indispensable element of collective security.

Activity of International Monetary Fund

Nenad POPOVIĆ

BY the end of last year on December 10, the International Monetary Fund announced that an agreement was reached enabling Great Britain to purchase 561.5 million dollars against payment in pounds sterling, and obtain another 738.5 million dollars if the need arises, thus bringing the total up to 1,300 million dollars. This represents the largest transaction of this kind carried out by the International Monetary Fund so far.

The International Monetary Fund was established with the intention of accumulating gold exchange resources which would provide some kind of international monetary reserve, and be at the disposal of the members of this organization. The general objective in view is the creation of a broader platform which would not only ensure a freer movement of the individual monetary systems, but also lead to the establishment of such international cooperation in the domain of foreign payments thus enabling the gradual implementation of an international monetary system as the basis of a freer world market. All these projects require vast resources, as well as the assumption of certain general norms which would regulate matters relating to international payments. In the first place, the resources of the International Monetary Fund are formed from members' quotas payable partly in gold dollars and partly in national currencies. The total resources of the International Monetary Fund are slightly over 9 billion dollars (9,923 million) of which 1,654 million was paid in free dollars (gold), while the payments made in convertible national currencies amount to 2,405 million dollars, or 4,060 million dollars in all. The utilization of these resources of the IMF were conditioned by the pursuit of such economic policies and maintenance of such payments systems by the members which coincide with the tendencies to establish a freer world market less hampered by restrictions.

The circumstances under which the IMF operated during the past ten years were not exactly favourable. On the one hand restrictions in international payments traffic are still a prominent characteristic of world economy, and on the other hand the resources of the IMF were not utilized to the volume originally foreseen. The standpoint was adopted in the IMF that the scale and volume of the post war dislocations in world economy were such that all resources of the IMF would not be able to bring about any tangible changes and that it would hence be spent in vain. Therefore the activities of the IMF were primarily directed towards the affirmation of such a policy and such a practice which would enable the individual countries to eliminate the fundamental causes underlying the dislocations and disparities. Only if this were accomplished, would the IMF be in a position to mobilize its resources with far greater efficiency.

The international economy was stabilized during the past few years especially in the developed countries which pursued a policy of full employment and expansion of production thus reestablishing balance on a higher level of economic activity. This was also reflected in the reduction of the strain on the balance of payments of these countries, enabling them to rely on their own resources to a greater extent and liberalize their payments relations with other countries. If thus happened that the IMF funds were most heavily drawn upon in the 1948—1950 period and largely resituated to the IMF later on. The consolidation of the international short term finances was reflected in the proportionate reduction of the utilization of IMF funds. By the end of 1956, prior to the British transaction, the total volume of the funds directly used amounted to only 258 million dollars (i. e. slightly over 6%, which is very little).

Since 1953 the IMF introduced a new mode of indirect utilization of funds, which were no longer directly granted but

held in preparation and utilized by request. These are the so-called "stand by" arrangements. Such arrangements were concluded by the end of 1956 to a value of 360 million dollars (or about 9% of IMF resources in gold and dollars).

The transaction with Great Britain in December last year, fundamentally alters the entire situation in the IMF. The directly used funds were raised from 258 million to 820 million dollars while the "stand by" credits were raised from 360 to about 1,100 million dollars. This means that the funds of the IMF in gold and dollars were directly utilized to a value of 20% and 27% indirectly. In other words while only 15% of total IMF funds were committed in November 1956, this percentage has now risen to 47% or from less than one sixth to almost half.

Consequently the conditions which prevailed prompted the IMF not only to take resolute action but also effect a fundamental change in its cautious policy pursued hitherto. Just as such a policy of the IMF was profitable it was no less subject to criticism. The advantages of such a policy lay in the fact that practically all the resources of the IMF were liquid thus strengthening its potential for an eventual active policy. Criticism was more or less general, especially in the case of the smaller and less developed countries. It was stressed with considerable justification that the IMF resources are perhaps inadequate for the interventions necessary in the large economies and therefore unable to check the major structural dislocations. In the case of the smaller countries however, a few million dollars extended by the IMF could vitally improve their position. Such an improvement would certainly compensate for and even eliminate the difficulties of the IMF which were called forth by the partial freezing of its utilized resources in more or less long term commitments. Therefore the smaller countries strove within the limits of their possibilities to support the cautious policy pursued by the IMF towards the big countries.

In 1956 the British economy experienced some difficulties which primarily consisted in certain symptoms of inflationist pressure. Great Britain was therefore obliged to pursue a fairly resolute policy geared towards curbing the elements of expansion which could have been dangerous. The rigorous fiscal policy as well as the restriction of investment expenditure proved efficient instruments in this respect. Both strove to ensure a deflationist counterpoise in economy. At any rate contemplated from the long term aspect such a course delayed and perhaps also impeded the volume of expansion required by the economy. Certain additional disturbances occurred last summer, and specially in the autumn which were mainly due to the British action on the Suez. In June 1956 the British dollar and gold reserves totalled almost 2.5 billion dollars, while dropping below the 2,250 million dollar mark in November and probably even below 2 billion at the beginning of this year. Such a development was mainly due to the lack of confidence in the pound sterling on the world market. This tendency was initiated in June when sterling payments were accelerated and receipts slowed down. In other words, short term funds flowed from the sterling into the dollar area, i. e. from the sterling bloc into the other exchange areas. This means that world economy, adopted a reserved attitude towards the pound to say the least. Although the matter began as a purely British problem, it soon assumed world wide proportions however.

Over half of world trade is effected in pounds, while besides Great Britain and its colonies the sterling area includes also Australia, Burma, Ceylon, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, New Zealand, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa. The eventual continuance of the pressure on the pound, the withdrawal of short term money etc. (as for instance fear of the devaluation of the

pound) could certainly cause far reaching disturbances and difficulties in the countries of the sterling area. There is no reason to believe that such tendencies should lead to the worst. However, even minor disturbances in the sterling area can give rise to normal and relatively limited adjustments which would represent a retrogression from the present conditions in the sphere of international payments and impair the further expansion of international commodity exchange.

It is certain that the measures of the IMF were aimed at preventing the crisis of the British pound sterling from causing a crisis on the world market. Contemplated from this standpoint, the problems of Great Britain appear less significant and are actually of secondary importance. The IMF was confronted with the problem whether to continue its cautious policy and risk the considerable consequences of such disturbances for world economy and the IMF, and the principle of international economic cooperation as such. This was a consideration which inevitably modified the attitude of the IMF and necessitated a solution which would prevent a more or less local difficulty from assuming the proportions of a crucial problem of world economy. In this respect the IMF had no alternative solutions. On the other hand this does not imply that the IMF could not and should not lay down a series of quite specific conditions referring to the essential characteristics of the British economic and political situation.

This was wholly reflected in the official communique issued by the IMF in announcing the transaction on December 10, 1956. It is stated *inter alia*, "In the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer Macmillan on December 4, and the assurances given the Fund on the part of Great Britain it was clearly stated that the Government intends to maintain the present sterling parity and avoid the reintroduction of external restrictions. For this purpose the Government of Great Britain stated that it will pursue such a fiscal, credit and other policies which will tend to strengthen the economy both internally and externally."

Such a formulation clearly and unequivocally indicates that Great Britain will continue to pursue the general economic policy

formulated several years ago and which was still more clearly defined in the monetary sphere by Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler in September 1955. It is therefore not incidental that Butler deputized for indisposed Premier Eden at the helm of the British Government precisely at the time of this great transaction. Consequently the major changes in the British Government which took place these days are not accidental either. And it is in this context that the development of the crisis over the Suez Canal and the efforts to liquidate this conflict should be contemplated.

The financial intervention of the International Monetary Fund represents an important step which has its positive aspects as well as its risks. Today almost one third of the convertible resources of the IMF (which includes over 60 countries) is committed in the recent transaction with Great Britain. This is certainly a hold stroke, but it can also be taken as an indication however that the IMF is ready to activate its policy and be gradually converted from a previous conscientious and sober guardian of the international monetary reserves into a conscientious and sober trustee of this community consisting of over 60 countries, by implementing an active policy which will be directed towards the solution of the existing major problems of world economy and enabling these countries to rely on the fund for assistance.

Great Britain will probably not be obliged to utilize the second part of the IMF, at least not wholly. Moreover, the other monetary resources of Great Britain and her uncommitted reserves are by no means small. The spotlight is therefore focused on the determination and efficiency of the new British Government and its persistence in resolving the internal and external economic problems that confront it. It should not be overlooked, that the countries grappling with balance of payments difficulties which are forced to impose restrictions on their commodity and financial transactions have the opportunity to profit by the possibilities afforded them by the IMF not only as an expert advisor but also as a material support both for themselves and the world economy at large. Needless to say, each case will involve such significant and complex economic issues as the fate of the pound sterling for instance, but their solution may nonetheless be significant.

Yugoslavia Today

YUGOSLAV SCIENTIFIC RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Siniša STANKOVIĆ

CHAIRMAN OF THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL OF FPRY

CONSCIOUSNESS of the need of international exchange of scientific experiences was never so developed as at present.

Science which is developing at an almost explosive speed during the past few decades penetrates today into all pores of social life and has become and indispensable condition for the advancement of material and spiritual culture of all peoples. The national framework has become too narrow and the further progress of science is only possible on a broad international basis. This is substantiated by the numerous scientific associations which enlist the representatives of science of majority of countries in the world and whose purpose is to stimulate and facilitate international scientific cooperation and the exchange of scientific experience. The same task has also been assumed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization UNESCO which is marking new successes from year to year.

Within the framework of the Yugoslav foreign cultural relations the contacts established in the sphere of science play an important part. manifold and various in form, scope and substance, promoted and strengthened after the war parallel with the reconstruction and development of the Yugoslav economic and cultural life, these relations represent an indispensable element of our cultural policy. It is only the possibility of gaining closer acquaint-

tance with the scientific results and achievements of other countries whose application could facilitate the Yugoslav development and accelerate the elimination of the heritage of our economic and cultural backwardness that is in question. It is not necessary to stress particularly that the adoption and transfer of scientific achievements of other countries especially in the field of engineering and technology is of major significance for the building up of the Yugoslav industry and especially the advancement of farm production. This is best testified by the successful experiments made with the introduction of hybrid maize whose large scale cultivation in the USA has raised the maize crop in that country substantially. Moreover the specialization of a large number of young Yugoslav experts and skilled workers in the domain of industry and agriculture in the scientifically and economically developed countries also aims at gaining acquaintance with the scientifically and practically tested technological processes.

This is far from all, however. There is no country in which science would have developed within the national framework without a greater or lesser degree of cooperation with other countries. Yugoslav science also cannot develop into an active factor of material and spiritual development without benefiting by the scientific experiences of the whole world, without lively and

active contacts and exchange with the foreign science and scientists. Science as systematized human experience and conscious research work is in the long run the fruit of international co-operation, the common achievements of mankind as a whole. And in many other fields of human activity, in scientific creativeness peoples borrow and give back at the same time. In order to develop soundly in the future the Yugoslav science must inevitably borrow and benefit by the stimuli afforded by the sciences of other countries, both with regards to the methods and techniques of research work, and as regards new fields of research, organizational forms of scientific work and application of scientific results.

Finally, scientific contacts with the world at large are one of the ways in which Yugoslav science contributes its share to world culture. However modest in scope and volume, the Yugoslav contribution to the general treasury of knowledge is real and positive. It enables other people to assess the extent of our cultural advancement, and appraise the development of our creative forces. Therefore the promotion of our foreign scientific relations represents a significant part of our cultural propaganda conceived in the most noble sense of the word, and on which our repute and cultural prestige in the world is largely contingent.

Therefore the forms and scope of Yugoslav scientific relations with the world at large and scientific public are far from immaterial.

The exchange of scientific publications is one of the most popular and widely used forms of scientific cooperation with foreign countries. This exchange has become very extensive during the past few years and is carried out not only through scientific institutions but also by way of personal exchange. The latter form is doubtless the most significant although it cannot be expressed in figures. It is a long standing tradition that the scientists of different countries exchange copies of their scientific publications among themselves and thus benefit mutually by each others experiences. The number of publications exchanged in this manner is very large. Some Yugoslav scientists have several thousand copies of scientific works received by way of personal exchange from various countries. Such collections represent valuable personal libraries which are indispensable for fruitful scientific work. With a view to facilitating exchange our scientists are publishing many of their works in foreign languages or accompany their writings in Serbo-Croat with summaries in a foreign language. Such personal exchange often develops into close scientific contact between Yugoslav and foreign scholars thus leading to direct collaboration. Such an exchange of scientific materials is increasingly frequent especially among biologist systematists as regards the determination and comparison of the organic species studied. Personal scientific exchanges although not so conspicuous are one of the most direct forms of scientific contacts which our scholars are carefully promoting and developing.

A large scale exchange of scientific publications has also been organized through the various scientific institutions. We will only cite the activities of the Serbian Academy of Science as an example which is exchanging publications with 339 foreign scientific institutions from 39 countries on all continents, which include 47 academies of science, 64 universities, 120 study societies, 33 big libraries and 75 specialized scientific institutions. In the course of one year alone the Serbian Academy received 6,743 foreign scientific publications to an approximate value of 30,000 dollars in exchange for the 3,620 books sent. The other Academies have also established broad contacts of this kind as well as the independent Yugoslav scientific institutions which publish their works in their own editions. The Yugoslav bibliographical institute in Beograd has also developed a very lively activity in this field having received 33,000 publications mostly of a scientific and technical character from 359 foreign libraries and scientific institutions in 1956.

The exchange of scientific literature is greatly facilitated by the summaries in foreign languages which accompany the majority of Yugoslav scientific papers published. Apart from this, each Academy of Science is publishing a special annual bulletin in which exhaustive extracts from Yugoslav scientific works are published. These bulletins are not only a means of scientific exchange but are also a suitable medium of keeping the foreign scholars informed of the scientific activities of the Yugoslav academies.

For the same purpose the Academic Council of Yugoslavia, one of the highest scientific institutions in this country took over the publication of a special new review "Bulletin Scientifique" in the foreign languages which keep the foreign public informed on the entire scientific activity in Yugoslavia, the results accomplished, the principal trends of research, the Yugoslav scientific institutions and scientists. This important review which is edited by a group of most distinguished Yugoslav scholars has already provided valuable information on all aspects of scientific life in Yugoslavia.

In this manner the Academic Council which unites the scientific activities of the three Yugoslav Academies of Science fulfilled one of its fundamental tasks of representing the Yugoslav science abroad and keeping the foreign public informed of the Yugoslav achievements in this field.

However the exchange of publications is far from being the only form of Yugoslav scientific relations with foreign countries. International scientific congresses, consultations and meetings have always played an important role in the development of the individual scientific branches. They provide a platform where by way of free discussion and scientific criticism, the results achieved in the domain of science are appraised on a world scale, the problems, ways and prospects of future research work charted and formulated, individual experimental methods discussed, theoretical generalizations made and new and old theoretical concepts and postulates subjected to criticism. Besides, international congresses are the most suitable place at which the foreign scientists are able to speak of their activities and subject the results achieved to the broadest competent criticism. Finally, the international scientific congresses are also indispensable because they provide an opportunity for direct personal contacts between people belonging to the same branch of science, the personal exchange of views and experiences which cannot be substituted by any written word. All this makes the choice of delegates to foreign international scientific conference as well as the character of their reports and addresses a matter of careful study for all participant countries.

The participation of Yugoslav delegates in international scientific congresses is primarily the concern of the Academic Council, although this function is also discharged by other institutions and organizations, to an even greater extent than the Academic Council during the past few years. Yugoslav participation at these Congresses after the war was very lively and broader than in the prewar period. Thus in the 1950—1956 period alone the Academic Council enabled the participation of 509 Yugoslav scientists of 328 international scientific congresses and conferences. However the number of delegates which were sent by other institutions and organizations especially those economic is actually far higher so that the above figure may without fear of exaggeration be raised to 2,000. It would be superfluous to emphasize the vast advantages of such participation for the further promotion and development of the Yugoslav scientific relations with other countries. This is confirmed by the reports of the Yugoslav delegates which contain numerous suggestions for the development of concrete forms of scientific cooperation with other countries. The narrower international scientific consultations (symposiums and colloquiums) dedicated to special problems to which Yugoslav experts in the field of biology, medicine, physics, chemistry engineering technical and other sciences were invited were extremely profitable.

The balance sheet of Yugoslav participation in international scientific meetings is on the whole positive and doubtless contributed to the promotion of our cultural prestige abroad. The Yugoslav delegates read 250 original scientific papers in the 1950—56 period which called forth a lively interest and were favourably appraised at the individual congresses and meetings. It is not the aim of this article to assess the successes of the Yugoslav science at international forums; it only wishes to stress the increasingly active participation of Yugoslavia in international scientific development. The latter fact was manifested in different ways at the scientific congresses: in the election of the Yugoslav delegates to the presidency of many congresses and of various sections; in the election to the presidencies of various international scientific societies; in the election of the Yugoslav delegates as the chief reporters on specific scientific problems; in the invitations to come and lecture after the congresses; in the proposals that certain international congresses be held in Yugoslavia; in the invitations extended to the Yugoslav scientists to cooperate on concrete scientific problems; finally in the special attention shown to many Yugoslav delegates who attended the international scientific meetings. Although the foregoing should have been illustrated by concrete examples, suffice it to mention the prominent participation of the Yugoslav scientists in the International Mediterranean Studies Commission of whom one was named Vice-Chairman of the Bureau of that Commission; a Yugoslav scientist was regularly elected Vice-Chairman of the International Limnological Association during the past twenty years; the Yugoslav scientists were elected members of the international committee for rheology, otolaryngology, the Union for Forest Research, for veterinary science, artificial fertilizer, mathematical union, etc. It should also be stressed that a Yugoslav scientist is a member of the the Advisory Committee for Natural Science at the UNESCO in Paris. In certain cases cooperation with foreign scholars has been so developed that our experts were consulted on the appointment of university professors in other countries.

It should be added that cooperation with foreign scientists also takes place during the Yugoslav scientific congresses which are being attended by an increasing number of foreign specialists.

The exchange of scientists between Yugoslavia and other countries is another important form of international scientific cooperation. This exchange is a highly efficacious medium for gaining mutual acquaintance of scientific achievements and methods. These visits are arranged in the first place by the Academic Council, the Academies of Science, the Universities, the Yugoslav national commission for the UNESCO as well as other scientific institutions and organizations especially the scientific societies. In principle the visits take place on a reciprocal basis and are usually invested with the character of a study trip or lecture tour.

In the 1950—1953 period alone the Academic Council enabled 119 scientists to study abroad many of whom had personal invitations to visit the respective countries. While becoming acquainted with the scientific institutions and activities of the individual countries our scientists also delivered lectures at the same time on Yugoslav scientific research and announced the results achieved especially in the domain of natural science and medicine. There were certain cases when Yugoslav experts were invited to work in foreign scientific institutions as for instance a biologist who spent a year as a fellow of a big medical institute in London. Many Yugoslav scientists actually held genuine brief courses on their narrower specialty at the foreign universities.

Many foreign scientists visited our country and held lectures on their specialty. Thus for instance the Yugoslav physicians societies arranged the visits of 120 foreign medical experts who delivered 130 lectures at the Yugoslav universities. On the invitation of the Academic Council, the universities and the Yugoslav Commission for the UNESCO, several leading scientists from Great Britain, USA, France, Holland, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Germany and other countries visited Yugoslavia among whom S. Zeppman the geophysicist, H. Pierron the psychologist, E. Bompiani the mathematician, A. Soleil the geographer, i Kolihof the chemist, A. Tinnemann the hydrobiologist, O. Surdy the ophthalmologist, J.R.N Stone the economists, Alexander King the specialist on organization of production and labour productivity, V. Thurell the botanist etc. and others. The visit of these distinguished scholars greatly contributed to the development of the Yugoslav scientific relations with foreign countries.

Finally the membership of the Yugoslav scientific institutions and scholars in international organizations, societies and

foreign national academies should be stressed as a special form of scientific cooperation. Through the Academic Council Yugoslavia is a member of over 15 international scientific unions, while 22 Yugoslav scientific institutions are members of 27 foreign organizations. The contacts with these vast international scientific bodies whose activities and publications are of particular significance for universal scientific progress, is maintained through the Yugoslav national commissions in which our distinguished experts are engaged. Personal membership is also a form of organized Yugoslav scientific relations with foreign countries. Thus up to 159 Yugoslav scientists were members of 120 foreign scientific organizations. These memberships represent a permanent and organized contact with foreign science and notably facilitate the exchange of scientific experiences between Yugoslavia and the world at large.

It is not possible to dwell here on the other special forms of Yugoslav foreign scientific relations, such as collaboration in foreign scientific publications, participation in international research projects (as for instance in the commissions for the exploration of the Mediterranean and the Danube) the numerous special relations between Yugoslav and foreign scientific institutes, joint scientific work of Yugoslav and foreign scientists, participation in international scientific excursions, exchange of scientific materials, participation in the organization of international scientific conferences etc. All these examples only illustrate the manifold character of the Yugoslav scientific relations with other countries and their scope.

There can be no doubt that conspicuous headway has been made in the post war period as regards the integration of the Yugoslav science in world scientific development. Today when our economy has made a great stride forward, thus confronting our science with new problems, the development and promotion of Yugoslav foreign scientific relations is an urgent and serious task. Even the most developed countries cannot dispense with the exchange of scientific experience with the other world. This is all the more true of our country whose development must proceed at a far more rapid pace and even skip entire stages with a view to reaching the level of the other more developed countries as soon as possible. However the further development of Yugoslav scientific cooperation with foreign countries requires an organized effort. It should be expected that the establishment of the National Council for the Organization of scientific research in Yugoslavia foreseen will contribute largely to the forging of still stronger links between the Yugoslav science and that of other countries, to the benefit of our entire community of peoples.

Documents

PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS OF YUGOSLAVIA

The Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was held on February, 1, 1957.

It was decided at the Plenum to hold the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists in Ljubljana in November 1957.

It was likewise decided that the following reports be submitted to the Congress:

- 1) Political report
- 2) Organizational report of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
- 3) Report on Programme of League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Delegates to the Congress will be elected as follows: one delegate per every 400 members of the League of Communists.

The plenum confirmed the composition of the Commission for the draft programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, proposed by the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists and consisting of the following comrades: Josip Broz Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Moša Pijade, Svetozar Vukmanović, Đuro Salaj, Vladimir Bakarić, Lazar Koli-

ševski, Cvijetia Mijatović, Milentije Popović, Veljko Vlahović, Anka Berus, Boris Zihert, Jovan Veselinov, Dobrica Ćosić, Milijan Neoričić, Predrag Ajtić, Janez Vipotnik.

The Plenum likewise named a commission for modifications and supplements of the Statute of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia consisting of: Moma Marković, Dobrivoje Radosavljević, Omar Kreačić, Cvijetin Mijatović, Vida Tomšić, Zvonko Brkić, Dušan Petrović, Krste Civenkovski, Pasko Romic, Mileva Planojević, Dragomir Nikolić.

Apart from this, the Plenum also examined some problems relating to the relations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia with other Communist parties and approved the activities of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

CHRONOLOGY

January 15 — The Yugoslav delegation which will hold talks with the Rumanian representatives on problems of dual ownership properties in the frontier zone left for Bucharest.

January 17 — The Yugoslav Air Transport company opened service on the new Beograd—Tirana international airline.

- January 17 — A delegation of the Chinese Parliament and City of Peking headed by Peng Chen, Vice President of the All-Chinese Congress of Peoples Deputies and Chairman of Peoples Committee of Peking arrived in Beograd. The delegation will visit various parts of Yugoslavia during its fortnights sojourn. Peng Chen invited a delegation of the Peoples Committee of Beograd to visit Peking.
- January 18 — The Chilean Senate ratified the agreements on the extension of the Trade and Payments Agreement between Chile and Yugoslavia.
- January 18 — The Yugoslav economic delegation headed by Kiro Gligorov which signed the Yugoslav Chinese Trade Protocol for 1957 and an Agreement on technical cooperation in Peking on January 4 returned to Beograd. The Agreement provides for seven million pound sterling worth of trade in 1957 (or 40% more than in 1956).
- January 18 — After an exchange of notes effected in Beograd the Yugoslav-Italian Trade and Payments Agreement and the Agreement on small border traffic which were concluded in Rome on March 31, 1955 definitely took effect.
- January 19 — Talks were opened in Moscow between a Yugoslav trade delegation and Soviet economic representatives on the conclusion of the regular trade agreement for 1957.
- January 19 — A team of the marine salvage enterprise „Brodo-spas“ consisting of 50 divers and other experts sailed from Smit for the Suez where it will take part in the clearance of the Suez Canal according to the contract concluded with the Dutch-Danish concern entrusted with this task by the UN.
- January 20 — A joint communique was issued in Beograd on the mission of Mr. Amir Hoveyda special representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who discussed the problem of the Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia with the Yugoslav Government. Mr. Hoveyda visited nine reception centres in which the Hungarian refugees are accommodated and became acquainted with the conditions and wishes of the refugees. The Yugoslav representatives stressed the need for immediate action on the part of the High Commissioner with a view to ensuring the promptest possible solution of the problem of the final resettlement of the refugees according to the principle of self determination, as well as the need of financial assistance to the Yugoslav Government for the care of the refugees.
- January 21 — Talks were opened in Rome between Yugoslavia and Italy on the conclusion of a new agreement on the crediting of Yugoslav purchases in Italy. The previous crediting arrangement was cancelled by Italy in November 1956.
- January 21 — President Tito sent a telegram greeting the Congress of the Danish Communist Party.
- January 21 — The visit of a Yugoslav Parliamentary delegation to Rumania was postponed because of the February elections in that country. A new date will be fixed after the constitution of the new Rumanian Parliament.
- January 22 — President Tito sent a telegram congratulating the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party and Vladislav Comulka on the splendid victory of the National Front at the recent elections.
- January 22 — Several regulations were adopted at the session of the Federal Executive Council which ensure the enforcement of the provisions of the Economic Plan on investments. The draft law on lawyers, the basic principles for the regulation of housing relations, and the decision to allot two billion dinars of credit for the construction of housing for coalminers were also approved at this session.
- January 22 — A Czechoslovak Government delegation headed by Minister of Education and Culture Dr Frantisek Kahuda arrived in Beograd where it will conclude a Convention on cultural and scientific cooperation with Yugoslavia.
- January 23 — The Rumanian and Yugoslav Government appointed chairmen of the Rumanian and Yugoslav commission within the joint studies society for the draft of a technical and economic memorandum on the construction of hydro-electric projects on the Iron Gates sector of the Danube. Minister of Electric Power Stations Stoiko Popa was appointed chairman of the Rumanian part of the commission, and Hasan Brkić President of the Foreign Trade Committee of the Yugoslav.
- January 24 — The plenary session of the Central Committee of the Peoples Youth organization of Yugoslavia inaugurated in Beograd; it was decided on this occasion that President Titos birthday will henceforth be celebrated as Youth Day.
- January 25 — A delegation of Polish workers factory collectives which will, as a guest of the Yugoslav Trade Unions, study the system of workers management and the Yugoslav economic system arrived in Beograd. The Secretary of the Central Council of Polish Trade Unions Joseph Kulesa also arrived with the delegation.
- January 25 — A delegation of the Rumanian Social insurance workers arrived in Beograd. They will visit the Yugoslav health centres as well as the towns inhabited by the Rumanian national minority.
- January 25 — A delegation of the Yugoslav War Veterans Federation left Beograd for Poland on the invitation of the Polish Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy. The delegation is headed by Dušan Petrović, member of the Central Committee of the War Veterans Federation.
- January 25 — A delegation of the Federal Chamber of Foreign Trade left for Berlin where it will conclude a trade arrangement with the representatives of the East German Chamber of Foreign Trade.
- January 25 — A spokesman of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs stated at a press conference that a total 11,018 Hungarians have sought asylum in Yugoslavia by January 25, 1956. During the past 24 hours alone 699 persons fled from Hungary to Yugoslavia.
- January 25 — Commenting on the Law on the organization of Slovene schools in Italy (which is soon to be debated in the Italian parliament) a spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat stated that the Yugoslav Government considers that by this draft law the Yugoslav national minority in Italy is deprived of the rights guaranteed it by the Peace Treaty and Memorandum of Understanding. The Yugoslav Government considers that the adoption of this Law would imply a discriminatory act towards the Yugoslav minority which would provoke justified resentment among the Yugoslav public opinion and have an adverse influence on the existing good neighbourly relations between Yugoslavia and Italy.
- January 25 — The Federal Nuclear Energy Commission under the presidency of Aleksandar Ranković adopted the work programme and plan for 1957 which calls for the continuance of the explorations and production of nuclear raw materials. Work will also continue on the construction of the nuclear reactor which will be equipped with auxiliary laboratories for the operation of the reactor and the production of radio-isotopes.
- January 28 — The twentieth anniversary of the Yugoslav-Danish friendship society was celebrated in the Yugoslav Legation in Copenhagen. On this occasion the Yugoslav Envoy Miloš Carević presented the Society with a Charter from President Tito and presented the prominent members of the Society with Yugoslav decorations.
- January 29 — President Josip Broz Tito received the delegation of the all Chinese Parliament and city of Peking headed by Peng Chen, Vice-President of the Standing Committee of the All Chinese Parliament.

- January 29 — An agreement on cooperation in the field of culture, science, education and schooling was signed in Beograd between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
- January 29 — The Presidium of the Rumanian Grand National Assembly ratified a series of Yugoslav Rumanian agreements concluded on October 27, 1956 (a trade, payments and cultural agreement as well as an agreement on technical and scientific cooperation and a trade protocol).
- January 30 — Ninety one Hungarian refugees who expressed the desire to return to their country were repatriated at the frontier crossing of Kotoriba.
- As previously announced the number of Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia increased to almost 14,000.
- January 31 — Mr Masanomu Tsuji, representative of the Japanese Government arrived on a goodwill mission to Beograd where he will hold talks with the Yugoslav officials.

DIPLOMATIC CHRONICLE

- January 16 The Yugoslav Ambassador Mišo Pavičević gave an official luncheon in Athens in connection with the transfer of the Permanent Secretariat of the Balkan Alliance to Beograd. The luncheon was attended by the representatives of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
- January 16 The new Yugoslav Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Hungary Jovo Kapičić left for Budapest.
- January 16 Mr. Lloyd K. Larson appointed new director of US Aid Mission to Yugoslavia. Mr. Larson previously occupied a similar post in Siam, Norway and Sweden.
- January 18 The Yugoslav Ambassador in the USA Leo Mates visited the US Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles.
- January 20 State Counselor to the Foreign Affairs Secretariat Dr. Stane Pavlič appointed Yugoslav Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Indonesia.
- January 21 President Tito received ambassadors Aleš Bebler, Ivo Vejvoda, Josip Djerdja and Marko Nikezić who are in Beograd at the usual consultations. Foreign Secretary Koca Popovic attended.
- January 23 During his trip to Bavaria, the Yugoslav Ambassador to West Germany Dušan Kveder called on the Prime Minister of the Provincial Government Hegner.
- January 23 The Indonesian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Sudarsono paid a courtesy call on the Chairman of the District Committee of Beograd Miloš Minić.
- January 25 The Vice President of the Federal Executive Council Svetozar Vukmanović and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović received the director of the International Monetary Fund who paid a ten day visit to Yugoslavia.
- January 25 After visiting the President of the Federal Peoples Assembly Moša Pijade and other distinguished Yugoslav personalities, the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia Sir Frank Roberts attended a farewell luncheon given in his honour by Foreign Secretary Koča Popović.
- January 26 The Yugoslav Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Cambodia Zdenko Stambuk made a courtesy call on the President of the Republic of Cambodia San Janu.

- January 28 President Tito gave a hunting party in Karadordevo for foreign Ambassadors and Envoys accredited in Yugoslavia who were subsequently his guests at dinner.
- January 28 The new French Ambassador to Yugoslavia Mr. Vincent Broustra arrived in Beograd.
- January 28 The Yugoslav Ambassador in Hungary Jovo Kapičić presented his letters of credence to the President of the Presidium of Hungary Istvan Doby.
- January 29 The Chinese Ambassador to Beograd Wu Hsi Chuan gave a reception in honour of the Chinese parliamentary delegation which is currently visiting Yugoslavia. The reception was attended by the highest Yugoslav officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps.
- January 30 President Tito gave his agreement for the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Lebanon Mr. Adib Nahas whose permanent seat will be in Athens.
- January 30 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović received the new French Ambassador Vincent Broustra who presented him with the copies of his Letters of Credence.
- January 30 The Yugoslav Ambassadors in Moscow and Warsaw Veljko Mićunović and Milo Milatović arrived in Beograd for usual consultations.
- January 30 The former British Ambassador to Yugoslavia Sir Frank Roberts paid a farewell visit to President Tito who retained him at lunch.

OUR NEW COLLABORATORS

ALEKSANDAR RANKOVIĆ: Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Commission, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, member of the presidency of the Federal Committee of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Peoples Liberation War Veterans, member of the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Dr. SINIŠA STANKOVIĆ was born in Zaječar in 1892. He studied biology in Beograd and Grenoble where took his doctors degree in 1921. Until World War II he was professor of zoology at the Faculty of Natural Science and Mathematics in Beograd. During the war he was a member of the Central People's Liberation Committee of Serbia, but was arrested in 1943 and imprisoned in the Banjica concentration camp from which he escaped in 1944. After the war Chairman of the Presidium of the Antifascist Council of Peoples Liberation of Serbia until 1953. Today he is professor of zoology at the University and Chairman of the Academic Council of Yugoslavia. He is a member of the Serbian Academy of Science since 1935 and a member of many foreign scientific societies.

Dr. Stanković is the author of numerous works in the field of ecology and bio-geography. The specific fauna of Lake Ohrid was a subject of his special study. His book "Okvir Života". (Frame of Life) contains a synthesis of ecological principles of the living world.

GAURO ALTMAN is a foreign political writer of "Borba". He was previously a journalist of Radio Yugoslavia.

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After Poland's elections

THE eighth plenary session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party was a turning point in Poland's socialist development, and the recent elections for the Sejm were — by their significance — a general referendum of the people for or against the new programme formulated last October. Just as the ideas put forward at the meeting of the Polish United Workers' Party could not have been separated from the fundamental strivings, needs and interests of the country, so the outcome of the referendum cannot be interpreted otherwise but as a general acceptance by the public of the „October road“ of the Republic. Opposing the pre-October conservative practice, stagnation and the renouncing of sovereign and progressive conceptions of socialist democracy — which now made it possible to revive the political, economic and social organism of the country as well as to re-establish its international affirmation — the Polish people in January, just as in October, displayed a high degree of political maturity, responsibility and healthy reasoning. Of about 18 million electors, over 16.5 million freely approved the programme of the United Workers' Party and the National Front embracing the country's independence and its own road to socialism. Just as the elections for the new Sejm were a decisive test for socialism in Poland, the unity of the people in their support of the policy of Secretary Gomulka and the United Workers' Party, were the factor which gave full value to the principles upon which changes in that country are being made. This unity is the best guarantee that the new Sejm, with its authority and new legislation, will be more energetic in following the road of internal democracy and in strengthening the organs of workers' self-government and other institutions of socialist democracy, through which the specific road of socialist development in Poland comes to expression.

Usually, three months do not mean much in the life of a country; in Poland, however, the period between October and January saw the opening of a new chapter in the history of socialist transformation, which — by its value and importance — transcends the boundaries of the country. The revolutionary change, which took place in October, is fully supported by the liberated socialist forces. Now, under new conditions, these forces for the first time acquired the possibility to participate, actively and consciously, and not only symbolically and formally as earlier „in developing a new ma-

chinery of government, in devising new forms of direct socialist democracy according to their own traditions, history and climate. Accepting the first achievements of October, the awakened masses continued to develop their creative initiative, approving the idea of workers' self-government, which was sanctioned by law in November 1956, as a means to decentralize the administration of the economy.

Together with the application of new socialist measures in internal development, the new leaders in the election campaign reaffirmed Poland as an independent sovereign country, thus strengthening its international positions. Rejecting a subordinate position in relation to the Soviet Union, and regulating political, economic and party relations with that country on the basis of independence, complete equality and non-interference, Poland strengthened the principle of sovereignty and the unity of socialism.

These achievements and the perspectives of development of both internal and external relations were given a striking support by the Polish people through the elections. Their unity, based on the past experience and bold re-orientation towards their own socialist order, was strong enough to break up the anti-socialist forces which with varying intentions and from different positions, attempted to discredit the October revolution and to use the great people's plebiscite to start internal disorders. However, the failure of these forces was an eloquent proof that neither the bourgeois reaction nor the conservative Stalinists can remain standing up in a fight with the living strength and practice of socialist democracy.

Under present conditions in the international labour movement, the convincing victory of the ideas of the United Worker's Party introduces new elements in the development of socialist thought and practice in the world. The example of Poland, which acquired full internal stability through national solidarity, enriches the experience of socialist development with new values, contributing to the affirmation of the principle that socialism cannot be developed in any country in accordance with some fixed patterns or permanent, unchangeable models; but in forms and by methods which correspond to the material and cultural wealth and to peculiar characteristics of every individual country. Therefore, true socialists rejoice in the victory of the Polish National Front headed by the United Workers' Party and Wladislaw Gomulka, considering that it

is a guarantee for Poland's socialist future and for the stabilization of peace in that part of the world. For, no matter how difficult a task the new Sejm is facing in liquidating the old methods and in strengthening the new road of development, we must not overlook the far-reaching result of Poland's October — the proof that only an independent, socialist and stable Poland can be a factor of peace in Central Europe and in Europe generally.

Ignoring United Nations Decisions

WHEN the Government of Britain France and Israel accepted the General Assembly's decision on the unconditional withdrawal of their invasion forces from Egyptian territory, they agreed to evacuate Egypt by December 21, 1956. France and Britain withdrew troops from Port Said in time, and so complied with the United Nations decision. But, Israel, which, in the aggression of October 31, 1956, had the role of an advance guard, seemed to be engaged in a delaying action in the last phase of the Suez crisis. The disregarded the explicit demand of the United Nations as well as her own promise to withdraw by a definite date. The renewed demands of the General Assembly of January 19, 1957, that within five days she should withdraw completely and unconditionally behind the 1949 demarcation line was also disregarded in Tel Aviv.

This is the chief reason why the United Nations is still engaged with the problem of ending the occupation of Egyptian territory, instead of tackling the next job — the regulating of navigation through the Suez Canal. Israel's disregard of the repeated demands by the General Assembly and world opinion placed the United Nations in a difficult situation again, thus creating a new zone of danger in the Near East. Withdrawing from the Sinai Desert, Israel however retained her troops in the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Akaba, and, to make the defiance of world opinion still more obvious, she assumed the role of a victorious power, and forwarded definite conditions to the United Nations.

It is easy to understand the surprise caused by the Israeli attitude in the United Nations and in the world. This surprise is all the greater because the conditions laid down by the Israeli Government supported by its allies from the October aggression,

constitute, in fact, an order to the United Nations. The state which started aggression, instead of assuming the consequences of the act, now asks nothing less than a change in the status of certain integral parts of Egypt, which, defying the decision of the United Nations, it still holds under occupation. For what Israel demands is international control of the Gaza area (an administration which would be run by Israel, the local Arab government and a United Nations agency), and the internationalization of the Gulf of Akaba. For this latter region Israel proposes a different status: special mandate powers for the United Nations in order to prevent Egypt from blockading the area, as well as a number of Israel-Arab agreements and guarantees from the great powers, particularly the United States. This demand is accompanied by the threat that Israel will oppose the entry of international troops into the Gaza area, as well as any restoration of direct or indirect Egyptian control over the region.

As a country which, through aggression disqualified itself for any equal bargaining, particularly since the resolutions of the General Assembly on the matter is quite clear, Israel should, under the Charter, comply with the United Nations decisions promptly and without complaint. By acting otherwise, she, as a member of the world organization, not only violates the basic provisions of the Charter, but undermines the very arguments she uses to back up her demands. In order to throw more light on Israel's attitude, we must consider the facts, which are indisputable.

First, according to the decision of the United Nations, the task of the United Nations emergency force in Egypt consists of controlling the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egyptian soil, including the Gaza area and the Gulf of Akaba. This force has not been empowered by the United Nations to exercise any power or to take part in the government of any region of Egypt, nor can it be given such powers.

Second, the Egyptian Government agreed to allow the United Nations force to enter Egypt on condition that her sovereignty is respected. Accordingly, any attempt to change the status of any part of Egyptian territory under the sponsorship of the United Nations would be a flagrant violation of Egypt's sovereignty and integrity.

Third, the establishment of any international administration in the Gaza area, a component part of Egypt, would be in contradiction with the provisions of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter itself. This is particularly so when a demand is made to sanction a definite state of affairs arising from aggression.

Fourth, the action of the United Nations was organized with the aim of stopping aggression and removing foreign troops from

Egypt. Only after this action can it become possible to approach the solving of the problems of Suez Canal navigation and Israel-Arab relations.

In view of the fact that during the two months of evacuation from the Sinai Desert, Israel has been obstructing the task of the United Nations force, her present demands must be viewed from a different angle. The intention of the demands appears to be to draw the United Nations into new crises and complications in the Near East, so as to perpetuate the danger of conflict and achieve some of the aims of the arrested aggression.

The United Nations has stopped aggression, but it now faces a new task — to ensure the implementation of its decisions and to liquidate the delays in the withdrawal of troops from Egypt. If it wishes to retain the initiative, it must be as decisive as when it opposed aggression, because the restoration of order along the demarcation line is the first prerequisite for pacification on the Near East and for solving, within the United Nations, of the problems of that area.

UNO, Viet-Nam and Korea

THE movers of the proposal — the USA and 12 other countries — that South Korea and Southern Viet-Nam be admitted to UNO, approach the solution of the Korean and Viet-Namese question from bloc positions, ignoring most of the Asian and world opinion, as well as the agreements on which even some of the mover countries have appended their signatures. Among the movers of the proposal on the admission of Southern Viet-Nam and South Korea are, besides the USA, France and Great Britain — the latter having only last year advocated the view that the decisions of the Geneva Conference on Viet-Nam should be consistently carried into effect. Britain was also, together with the USSR, one of the initiators of the action for organizing general Viet-Namese elections. But the elections were not held, chiefly owing to the non-recognition of the Geneva Agreements by the South-Vietnamese Government.

Have Southern Viet Nam and South Korea the qualifications for admission to membership in the World Organization, as the American delegate declared a few days ago proposing the admission of South Korea to UNO, or were the movers of the proposal guided by quite different reasons and principles. Would the admission of South Korea and Southern Viet-Nam contribute to the solution of the complex questions in these countries on the basis of the already adopted international decisions or would this only aggravate bloc contradictions in Asia

and in the world? The movers of the proposal approached the problem from the positions of their own strategic, political and economic interests. Their aim was first of all, to strengthen the regimes in power in those countries by way of their affirmation through the membership in UNO. As the South Viet-Namese and South Korean Governments are under the influence of the USA, their membership in the UNO would strengthen the positions of the West in that organization, the positions which had been weakened through the admission of new members from Asia and Eastern Europe during the current and last session of the General Assembly.

The question is raised why South Korea and Southern Viet-Nam should have more right to represent their peoples in UNO than Northern Viet-Nam and Northern Korea. What are the qualifications possessed by these two states, on the basis of which they can be members of UNO, and which the northern parts of these countries lack? The ruling regime is certainly not the criterion for admission to UNO membership as this would not be in the spirit of the statute of the World Organization which entitles every people to choose its own state organization.

Is it enough to say that South Korea took part in the war against Northern Korea on the side of UNO at a justification for admission to the World Organization prior to the unification of the country through free elections? Northern Viet-Nam took no part in any war waged by the UNO forces. That country's Government is constantly expressing its solidarity with the UNO principles. With its stand at the Geneva Conference and later, it showed its sincere wish for peace and unification of its country on the basis of Geneva agreements. Yet they propose the admission of South Viet-Nam to UNO, ignoring the need for unification of Viet-Nam. And finally, how is one to explain the fact that almost at the same time when certain delegations propose the admission of South Korea to UNO, the head of that state issues war threats and informs his compatriots above the 38th parallel that he will "liberate" them this year. Similar voices are being increasingly heard in Southern Viet-Nam also. Are such warlike statements a qualification for admission to UNO?

The Soviet proposal for the admission of both parts of Korea and Viet-Nam is more realistic. But neither is this proposal in keeping with the prospects of unification of the peoples of Korea and Viet-Nam, nor with the past attitude of the Soviet Government which, especially on the question of Northern Viet-Nam, was in favour of a consistent implementation of the Geneva agreements. By admitting separate parts of Korea and Viet-Nam to membership, the United Nations would sanction their exist-

tence as separate states. The Soviet draft resolution came, probably, as a reaction to the USA proposal, so the admission of both Korea and Viet Nam to UNO would be a more equitable solution but even this would be so only in the situation of choosing the lesser of two evils.

It is well known that the division of Korea and Viet-Nam is artificial, that it does not reflect the wish and will of the Koreans and Viet-Nameese, but that it is the consequence of the bloc division in the present world. Therefore, the only just solution of the problem of Viet-Nam and Korea lies in the organizing of general elections in Viet-Nam and Korea for the setting up of single and generally elected Governments. Only such Governments would have the full right to represent their peoples in the UNO. Unfortunately the present situation and relations in the world are such that this cannot be expected to happen in the foreseeable future.

Two Conceptions

THE Eisenhower doctrine, based on the theory of vacuum, revealed the fundamental aims of America's new Middle Eastern policy, and the recent Ankara and Cairo meetings of the countries from the "vacuum area" formulated the attitude of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact and of the Arab countries towards Washington's latest intentions and towards other problems of their region. Both the official announcement and semiofficial statements, which coincided, perhaps not accidentally, again confronted two largely different conceptions.

The Premiers of Turkey, Iraq, Persia and Pakistan met in Ankara to consider — on the basis of the Baghdad Pact — the situation in the Middle East after the attack on Egypt and the announcement of the Eisenhower doctrine, together with the internal problems of their own military and political organization, which in many respects reflect the latest developments in the world, particularly in that region. The announcement that what was taking place was a meeting of the "Moslem Pact members" formally explained the absence of Britain, the earlier spiritual leader of the Pact, but it actually showed that the whole organization was facing formidable difficulties and contradictions.

Based on bloc conceptions, the Baghdad team, from the very beginning, represented an artificial and heterogeneous group. Great Britain had neither the strength nor the ability to ensure any bright perspective for the organization. She was secretly against the United States joining it, merely because she did not want the Americans to acquire another opportunity for expansion in that area, while Turkey, Iraq, Persia, and Pakistan thought that only America's participation in the pact would justify its existence. And now, Britain's Suez adventure, which placed Iraq, the only Arab member of the Pact in an awkward position in relation to the Arab world, and Pakistan in relation to the Afro-Asian group, further increased the contradictions between London and its Baghdad partners.

The Eisenhower doctrine, therefore, found fertile soil in Ankara. The four countries acclaimed the American new policy in the Middle East, emphasizing once again the need for America's participation in the Pact. They said that there were some unclear points in the Eisenhower doctrine, but they did so to please the Arab world and not because they really failed to understand the doctrine itself. This matter, they made it known, would be settled during the forthcoming visit of the Iraqi Crown Prince to President Eisenhower. Fearing the possibility of "subversive infiltration", and remaining loyal to the ideological vocabulary, the four Premiers did not deviate from the principles of bloc politics, although they emphasized that, in their opinion, the presence of the United States in the Middle East would not be a new impulse to the policy of spheres of influence. Insisting that there was a "Soviet danger", they addressed some sharp words to Syria (for the destruction of pipe lines, for her allegedly pro-Soviet attitude, etc.), while in the question of Israel's withdrawal from Egypt they merely asked for the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions.

In Cairo, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, linked by a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, had an opportunity to meet representatives of Jordan, whose inclinations towards an independent policy, which begun to be noticed after the expulsion of Glub Pasha two years ago, and after the unsuccessful attempts to draw Jordan into the Baghdad Pact, were strengthened by the election victory of the present premier, Suleiman Nabul.

In assessing the solidarity of the Arab countries grouped around Egypt, no one should

disregard certain differences which existed in the process of consolidating their independence. Egypt, which emerged as a victorious power from the Suez campaign, has strengthened her positions of independence, becoming a true arbiter in the free Arab world; Syria, certainly the closest ally of Egypt, has also established her own independent policy; Saudi Arabia, where the American oil company holds considerable positions, is still an attractive point for the Baghdad Pact countries in spite of her policy of loyalty to Cairo; and Jordan, it seems, has just ceased to be such. Due to these differences, which are now smaller than ever, the unity displayed by the four countries at the Cairo conference is all the more important.

Believing that the fate of the Middle East should be decided by the Middle Eastern countries themselves, and that the cause of all disputes and disagreements in the area was the policy of the great powers, the four countries in essence declared themselves against the Eisenhower doctrine, although in principle they accepted the possibility of implementing some of its ideas, particularly in the economic field. Reminding that only recently the danger to the independence of the Middle East was coming from Great Britain and France — the members of the Western bloc — and that there was no danger from Soviet domination, they condemned the policy of spheres of influence and military patrons in their region. The vacuum theory is undoubtedly the theory of the immaturity of the Arab peoples, and the way of preventing infiltration by one bloc is surely not in allowing infiltration by the other.

In this respect, great importance must be attached to the decision of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia to grant 12.5 million pounds to Jordan annually as compensation for the assistance which that country was receiving from Great Britain. This decision will undoubtedly lead to talks in Aman for the abrogation of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, under which Britain acquired the right to maintain air force basis in Jordan. The situation along the Yemeni frontier, is said to be caused by increased British pressure on Jordanian policy, which has evolved in anti-British direction in the last ten months. The chief of the Arab states devoted a great deal of attention to the consequences of a possible failure of the United Nations to force Israel to evacuate the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Akaba and to withdraw behind the 1948 demarcation line.

ADVERTISE THROUGH OUR REVIEW

These were two meetings, defending two different conceptions. Although the New York Herald Tribune states that there are certain similarities between some peripheral points, the differences in the Middle East are of a profound character. Ankara stands for the theory and practice of bloc politics, Cairo for the policy of non-alignment. The rapprochement of views, which is expected to be made in Washington during the visits of King of Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince of Iraq, would not produce any greater results if it is true that the blocs and the independent policy of the Arab countries are contradictory. And that they are really in contradiction is best shown by the Eisenhower doctrine, which failed to reconcile its bloc conceptions with its proclaimed concern for the free development of the peoples in the Middle East.

Personalities and Politics

There are people who are charming and those who are not. As it is being said, General Speidel belongs to the first category. His face, without any crude militaristic lines, reveals a mild man, and his attitude and bearing have nothing of the classical attributes of the Prussian junker. General Speidel is, to say it briefly, a gentleman *il faut*.

This is what some French papers say, and the man concerned is the new Commander of the NATO Land Forces in Europe, who during the war was chief of the German occupation staff in France and the right hand man of Field Marshal Rommel.

The classification of people can be, but need not be correct. In this case it seems certain that General Speidel must have

possessed, in addition to his charm, also other qualities, which first brought him into Rommel's and now into Norsted's headquarters. Therefore, we must now be more concerned with politics than with personal qualities of the man.

The policy of the United States in Europe, and, within its scope, the European strategic policy of the Atlantic Pact, are attaching ever greater importance to the future role of Western Germany. Great Britain is not a European power, and France has long ceased to be such. Accordingly, the "European vacuum" must be filled by the restored German military power — naturally within the Atlantic Pact. It is for this reason that the French general (Guillot) was relieved of the command of the NATO land forces and replaced by a German colleague.

In selecting the personality for this post, the old Chancellor probably did not have completely free hands, but the choice had to have his consent. That the choice of Speidel had Adenauer's full approval is shown by the fact that Speidel's position in the Bonn ministry of defence corresponded to the post of Chief of Staff, and that, from the very beginning of his career in the Federal Republic, he was Adenauer's military adviser.

Just as it was not accidental that a German general came to occupy so responsible a post in the Atlantic Pact, it is not surprising that the choice fell on General Speidel. If there are, however, reasons for any surprise at all (a Dutch paper recently wrote that ten years ago a mere proposal to nominate Speidel to such a post would have been enough to send one to prison), they now lie in NATO's bloc policy and intentions, as well as in the dangerous idea of reviving an army with ideologically and militarily discredited personnel (Western Germany).

Speidel, by himself, is certainly of secondary importance.

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